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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the contemporary criminal justice system can be described in terms
of two distinct shifts in the relationship between state and society and in the role of law in
mediating that relationship. The more obvious of these shifts is the direct expansion of
the modem state's sovereignty over the affairs of citizens, as is perhaps best evident in the
demise of libertarian interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and attendant increases in
state prerogative. The second, less obvious shift involves a dramatic erosion of the state's
monopoly of criminal justice functions--that is, the "privatization" of criminal justice.
Although evident in the rise of victims' rights regimes, private police forces, and even
private financing of criminal prosecutions,' this privatization of criminal justice may be
most notable in the re-emergence of the private prison.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; J.D., Yale University School of Law,
1994.
1. On the parameters of the victims' rights movement, see, e.g., NEW DIRECIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICrIMS
RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY (Dep't of Justice, Office of Victims' Programs 1998); on private
policing, see David S. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165 (1999); on private prosecutions, see
Joseph E. Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions: The Differing Protections of Liberty and
Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665 (1997).
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At present, about 120,000 men, women, and children are incarcerated in
privately managed, for-profit jails, prisons, and detention facilities-in the hands,
literally, of an oligopolistic industry with annual revenues of at least $1 billion and
perhaps far more than this. Though these figures are still dwarfed by the two
million jail and prison inmates in America today and the huge economic scale of
incarceration generally, they also reflect an annual rate of growth in private
incarceration that has over the past several years averaged four times that of the
2(already astronomical) overall growth in criminal incarceration. Perhaps more
tellingly, this industry only emerged in its modem form about fifteen years ago.
The straightforward expansion of state sovereignty in the criminal context has
garnered substantial criticism from practical, political, and jurisprudential angles.3
But the privatization-or, as one should say, the semi-privatization-of criminal
justice has escaped comprehensive criticism. Instead, critiques of the private
prison tend to focus narrowly on the institution's practical, legal, or general
normative failures, and do so to the exclusion of any sustained focus on the private
prison's implications for the changing relationship between state and society and
the way the law mediates that relationship. In short, there persists a crucial failure
to mount a jurisprudential critique of the private prison.
In this Article, I argue that a rigorous jurisprudential critique of the private
prison shows that the private prison tends to distort dramatically the relationship
between state and society in the criminal context, and does so in a way that
contradicts the most central of liberal legal precepts: the rule of law. Such a rule of
law critique of the private prison sees in that institution a key development: the
simultaneous expansion and diffusion of state sovereignty, accompanied by the
thorough merger, or interpenetration, of public and private realms. This process
renders the private prison utterly inconsistent with the rule of law's central
aspiration: the restraint of sovereignty and the concomitant realization of negative
freedoms and minimal equality by the mediation of law. From this perspective, and
2. Published sources on the number of persons incarcerated in either public or private institutions are outdated
almost as soon as they appear in print. In part for this reason, the most current data on private prisons are available
through the website at the Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, the University of Florida, at http:II
web.crim.ufl.ed/pcp (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). This organization is run by Charles Thomas, private prison
scholar and proponent (and, as we shall see below, investor). It is also important to note that most statistical data
on the scope of private prisons refers to numbers of available beds, as opposed to actual numbers of inmates; at a
time of considerable expansion in inmate numbers and overcrowding, these two figures tend to be very close.
On the scope of incarceration generally, see, e.g., JASON ZIEDENBURG & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, THE PUNISHING
DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM (Justice Policy Institute 1999), available at
www.cjcj.org.jpi/publications.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). See also ALLEN J. BECK & CHRISTOPHER J.
MutRMOLA, PlIsoNERs IN 1999 (Dep't of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000).
3. For a brief sample of notable monographs in this area, see DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1998); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1997); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: Tim REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMtSSION (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996).
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following Stanley Cohen's more general critique of criminal justice reforms, I
argue that the private prison inevitably constitutes an extravagant, but at the same
time insidious, aggregation of state power in a context where such power is being
deployed in a largely irrational way..4 Such a critique reveals with considerable
irony that the privatization of prisons, a movement ostensibly based on the ideal of
the "minimalist state," is actually the antithesis of such an ideal.
This notion that the rule of law is premised on an aspiration to restrain
sovereignty is shared in key respects by such diverse figures as the liberal,
Friedrich von Hayek, and the neo-Marxist jurist, Franz Neumann. The rule of
law's antithesis to the private prison follows more specifically from the idea that
the rule of law's sovereignty-restraining aspiration presupposes the clear demarca-
tion of the sovereign and the transparency of sovereignty, which in turn presup-
poses the substantial segregation of public and private realms. Although these
conditions have never been fully realized in any society,5 and in many ways
constitute a problematic formulation, the regime implied by the rule of law retains
a contingent normative value, guaranteeing a baseline of liberty and equality.
Inasmuch as the private prison is premised intrinsically on the simultaneous
extension and diffusion of sovereignty, and also on the merger of the public
and private, it is intrinsically at odds with the rule of law and emerges as a
fundamentally illiberal development-far more problematic than the public prison
already is.
6
Of course, the doctrine of the rule of law is not a rule of law in the literal sense: a
"violation" of the rule of law does not make something illegal in any positive
sense. Still, this Article's critique of the private prison is practically, and perhaps
even legally, relevant in several ways. First, it gives general jurisprudential
structure to a debate that largely lacks such structure. Second-and perhaps this is
part of the basis of its claim to be jurisprudential-this Article's critique of the
private prison describes a common link between erstwhile separate normative,
practical, and legal critiques of this institution. This Article argues that there are
very concrete connections between the private prison's anti-rule of law character
and its practical, legal problems. The history of the private prison's antecedents,
especially of the convict lease system, shows clearly that the private prison's
ubiquitous tendencies to corruption, legal ambiguity, and the augmentation of state
4. See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION (1985).
5. On the incompleteness with which such conditions have been realized, see, e.g-, David M. Lawrence,
Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647 (1986). A good example of the degree to which the
legal system resists a rigorous interpretation of these injunctions is the jurisprudence arising under the "takings
clause" of the Fifth Amendment, where the "public use" requirement is interpreted in an extremely broad way.
See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
6. As I will emphasize below, this Article is not a defense of the public prison as such, but rather a critique of
the private prison as, in effect, a substantially more problematic version of an always problematic institution.
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power are tied organically to its inconsistency with the rule of law.7 In other words,
history shows that the otherwise abstract antithesis between the private prison and
the rule of law seems to be accompanied by inherent tendencies to translate into
significant practical and legal problems as well.
In order to develop these arguments, this Article proposes in Part II a definition
of the rule of law that transcends conventional ideological positions, that is
centered on the concept's sovereignty-restraining aspiration, and that stresses the
doctrine's contingent rationality. Such a definition is shown to imply the separation
of public and private and the clear demarcation of sovereignty. Here I begin to
develop the notion that the rule of law is fundamentally inconsistent with the
private prison. Part III tackles the crucial and deceptively complex matter of
defining the private prison. Here, I outline the curious history of the private prison
and show that the private prison, in some form or another, is the historical norm.
Next, Part IV describes the old convict lease system as the contemporary private
prison's closest juridical antecedent, as an institution that closely anticipates the
contemporary private prison's relationship to the rule of law and the question of
sovereignty, and anticipates as well the positive, organic relationship between the
private prison's abrogation of the rule of law and its persistent practical and legal
failures. In Part V, I describe in more detail the characteristics and origins of the
contemporary private prison and expose the shortcomings of existing attempts to
critique the phenomenon. This Part also comprises the main critique of the private
prison from a rule of law perspective. Here as well I consider the limits of this
Article's critique with regard to other modes of privatization. Finally, Part VI
offers a cautionary conclusion that considers the implications of the private prison
in broader context.
II. RULE OF LAW AND THE RESTRAINT OF SOVEREIGNTY
The question that always greets any scholarly mention of the rule of law is
whether the concept actually possesses any real scholarly value, or whether it is
merely a vehicle for partisan rhetoric. Certainly the rule of law enjoys a prominent
place in contemporary legal, political, and social discourse. A reader need only
peruse, for example, contemporary finance magazines, human rights tracts, and
international politics journals to encounter a steady stream of arguments and
claims couched in rule of law terms. But more often than not, the rule of law
operates in these fora as a fuzzy euphemism for a set of institutions that (quite
7. Following a perspective inspired by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, this Article likewise attempts to
understand the private prison, both genetically and functionally, in terms of its larger socio-historical context-
and not simply, for example, in terms of political or ideological debates. See generally GEoRO RusctE & OTTO
KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1968). Rusche and Kirchheimer's approach, it should be
noted, can be criticized for its overly functional and economistic logic; inasmuch as there is some truth to 'such
criticisms, Rusche and Kirchheimer's approach must be qualified by a sensitivity to other forces. See generally
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990).
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conspicuously) seems to approximate the aspirations and self-images of contempo-
rary Anglo-American society. In contemporary discourse, the rule of law is
variously equated with the legal structure of so-called free-market finance capital-
ism,8 the norms of the western human rights agenda,9 or a constitutional order that
usually is similar to the American model. 10
While even semi-serious appeals to the rule of law provide some evidence that
the concept has not been completely trivialized, there is something rather trou-
bling, or at least grossly inadequate, about the usual manner by which the rule of
law is construed. Contemporary perspectives on the rule of law do little justice to
the jurisprudential character of the concept. Even in scholarly circles, the concept
usually is reduced to its bare functional or instrumental aspects, rhetoric, slogans,
and operational figments. Such a move is problematic not simply because the rule
of law can mean so much more, but also because the jurisprudential themes
skipped over by this logic contain the concept's most fundamental, critical
components.
At the logical and genetic core of the rule of law is a fundamentally jurispruden-
tial agenda: the restraint of sovereignty by law and the concomitant idea that in a
rational society, law aggressively mediates the relationship between the state on
the one hand, and civil and domestic realms, on the other. It is this sovereignty-
restraining aspiration that underlies and really accounts for the rule of law's more
specific and formal claims: generality, universality, and non-retroactivity of legal
norms, separation of powers, and so forth. The present critique of the private
prison is jurisprudential because its .rule of law critique of the private prison is
couched squarely in such sovereignty-restraining logic."
This sovereignty-restraining notion of the rule of law surfaces in the earliest
attempt to define the concept. In the Western world, the idea of the supremacy of
law over politics emerged in classical society and was entrenched substantially
(albeit with limited scope) by the Middle Ages.1 2 According to Geoffrey Walker,
8. See, e.g., Owen Lipper, The Americas: Pirates Plunder Patents: Will the Rule of Law Prevail?, WAU. ST. J.,
Apr. 17, 1998, at A15; Mary Doyle, From Russia With Doubts, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1990, at 23.
9. See, e.g., Mehlika Hoodboury, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong, 24 HUMAN RIGHTS 5
(1997); William M. Cohen, Principlesfor Establishment of a Rule of Law Criminal Justice System, 23 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 269 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Mark F Brzezinski, Constitutionalism and Post-Communist Polish Politics, 20 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REV. 433 (1998); No Rule of Law: Having Rescued Kuwait, the West Now has the Job of Making it a
Better Place, ECONOMIST, June 22, 1991, at 15; Edward Georgian, Hong Kong Fears Unraveling of Rule of Law,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1997, atA2.
11. By "jurisprudential" critique I mean a critique that focuses generally on the relationship between law and
society and that looks somewhat more specifically to the role of law in defining and segregating social realms. I
believe that such a perspective is consistent, too, with the one contemplated by Roger Cotterrell. "Jurisprudence
is, therefore, probably best defined negatively as encompassing all kinds of general intellectual inquiries about
law which are not confined solely to doctrinal exegeses or technical prescriptions." ROGER COTTERRELL, THE
POLMCS OF JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (1989).
12. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 93-97
(1988).
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the rule of law, at least in concept, survived the oscillations of royal powers in the
Medieval and early modem eras to emerge in modem times as a viable set of
claims against the unmeasured administration of power by sovereigns. 13 But in the
final analysis it is only with modem interpretations of the rule of law-at least the
serious ones-that a consistent emphasis is placed on the rule of law's sovereignty-
limiting character.' 4 Montesquieu, especially, offers the notion that the rule of law
demands the comprehensive restraint of sovereignty. 5 In such a mode, the concept
of the rule of law was eventually able to comprise the juridical ideology, one might
say, of bourgeois ascendancy, forming a set of effective challenges to aristocratic
prerogative as well as the. juridical basis for "free" competition within the
structures of the capitalist market.
16
An essentially sovereignty-restraining view of the rule of law to a large degree
transcends the political perspectives of its modem exponents. Thus, such a view
pervades the work of the archliberal Friedrich von Hayek and the common law
parochialist A.V. Dicey, the consummate liberal centrist Max Weber, as well as the
Marxist jurists Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, and the Marxist historian
E.P. Thompson. 17 The essential aspects of Hayek's and Dicey's perspectives on the
rule of law are fairly well-known and bear little repetition.'8 The same might be
said of Weber, who famously draws a complex causal link between the emergence
of rule of law norms and the rise of modem capitalism.' 9 But for American
audiences, the contributions of Thompson and especially Neumann and Kirchhei-
mer to the rule of law debates are rather less familiar. Thompson's detailed analysis
of class relations in early modem England prompt him to conclude that "the rule of
law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of the
13. See id. at 97-127. Cf. FRANZ L. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
IN MODERN SOCIETY 66-76 (1986).
14. See WALKER, supra note 12, at 1-48.
15. On Montesquieu's centrality to the development of rule of law, see, e.g., Judith Sklar, Political Theory and
the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 5-6 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monohan eds.,
1987). Cf. Franz Neumann, Montesquieu, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 96, 114-43
(Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957).
16. This point is well developed in critical, especially Marxist, discourse. See, e.g., Franz Neumann, The
Change in the Function of Law in Modem Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22
(Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957).
17. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1961); WILLIAM E.
SCHEUERMAN, THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ NEUMANN AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER
(1996); E.E THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1977); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960); NEUMANN, supra note 16; MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947);.
18. On Hayek's rule of law, see, e.g., JOHN GREY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY (1986). On Dicey's rule of law, see, e.g.,
Jeffrey Lowell, The Rule of Law Today, in THE CHANGING CONsTrruON (Jeffrey Lowell & Dawn Oliver eds.,
1989). See also WALKER, supra note 12 passim.
19. All key aspects of a rule of law construct are evident in Weber's portrait of "formal-rational" legal thought.
On Weber's jurisprudential thought, see, e.g., Max Rheinstein, Introduction, in ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
xxv-lxxi (1954).
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citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human
good."20
Neumann's and Kirchheimer's engagements with the concept are rather more
extensive and nuanced than Thompson's, but ultimately reach the same conclu-
sion. For Neumann and Kirchheimer, both sovereignty and freedom from sover-
eignty are essential ideological and functional bases of modem society. The rule of
law emerges, they argue, as a means of forging a provisional, workable reconcilia-
tion of these fundamentally contradictory dynamics. 2 Like Thompson, and to
some extent Weber, Neumann and Kirchheimer end up with a healthy, but
thoroughly contingent, regard for the value of the rule of law vis-a-vis the quest for
human freedom and reason.22
However contingent, such leftist defenses of the rule of law have drawn heavy
fire from contemporary critics who stress endemic connections between the rule of
law and such evils as class exploitation, patriarchy, and the oppression of
minorities.2 3 There certainly is good reason to be circumspect about the ultimate
value of the rule of law to the quest for a truly rational social world and good
reason as well to be aware of the connections between existing rule of law norms
and exploitation, patriarchy, and so forth. Yet as Marx himself anticipated, it is
probably wrong to draw too tight an association between the rule of law as such
and capitalism's (or modernism's) defeat of equality, reason, and human dignity.24
Indeed, perhaps even more to the point are the arguments of Neumann and
Kirchheimer, identifying an ugly, intimate connection between anti-rule of law
"decisionism" as intellectualized by Carl Schmidt, on the one hand, and the
policies and structures of twentieth century fascism, on the other. Neumann and
Kirchheimer make clear not only that the rule of law need not be opposed
intrinsically to leftist agendas, but also that leftist agendas are usually first to
suffer, and leftist gains first to fall, when the rule of law is abrogated by modem
regimes."5
20. THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 258-69.
21. See Neumann, supra note 16, at 22-28; see also NEUANN, supra note 13, at 25-46.
22. See NEUMANN, supra note 13, at 32-34.
23. For contemporary leftist attacks on the rule of law and on leftist defenders of rule of law, see, e.g., Morton
J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977) (reviewing DOUGLAS HAY
Er AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY [N EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975) and E.P. THOMPSON,
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975)); Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983).
24. See, e.g., KARL MARx, On the Jewish Question, reprinted in KARL MARX, EARLY WRIlINGS 211, 221
(Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Penguin Books 1975).
25. For an excellent analysis of the jurisprudential thought of Neumann and Kirchheimer and their relationship
to Schmidt and other anti-rule of law figures, see WILLIAM B. ScHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NoRM AND THE
EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1997). See also Roger Cotterrell, The Rule of Law in
Transition: Revisiting Franz Neumann's Sociology of Legality, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 451, 459-62 (1996)
(identifying deep "ethical" virtues of Neumann's rule of law concept: equality, individual autonomy, and
security).
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Whatever the final merits of this debate-I tend to accept Neumann's and
Kirchheimer's claims-the point remains clear that for serious advocates of the
rule of law, the concepts' sovereignty-limiting function is absolutely key. How, one
might wonder, does the rule of law accomplish such an end? On this point, too,
there actually is substantial consistency. Serious defenders of the rule of law insist,
in the first instance, that the concept, while not a statement of law in its own right,
must be understood to possess a minimal amount of legal authority, to operate, as
Hayek puts it, as a "meta-legal doctrine," or as Neumann implies, as a secular,
quasi-natural law doctrine.26 Beyond this, there is agreement too that the rule of
law's sovereignty-restraining function rests on the application of a set of subsid-
iary principles-in particular: generality, neutrality, universality, non-retroactivity,
separation of powers, the insularity of the legal system, and so forth-to the
normative structure of the law.2 7
Such an agenda implies a social system premised on the segregation of political
and legal authority, formal equality, and "negative" freedoms vis-A-vis the sover-
28Thsrateign. This relationship in turn presupposes a mutually exclusive, but at the same
time complementary, distinction between the public realm, the home of sover-
eignty, and the private realm, the negative reflection of sovereignty. The resulting
regime is not unproblematic. For example, the public-private distinction tends to
sanction the substantial residual sovereignty (in the form of tyranny, really) and
inequality of the domestic realm.29 And as both Marxists and Weberians recognize,
the rule of law simultaneously facilitates and reflects the exploitative, alienating
dimensions of capitalist civil society. Nevertheless, like Marx, Neumann and
Kirchheimer, and, to some extent, Weber, I think it is important to embrace the rule
of law as the apogee of legal rationalization under our existing historical horizon.
Even more fundamentally, it may be that some variant of the rule of law will
always be preferable to a system in which power knows no restraint; it may be that
the rule of law is essential to any rational social order. °
Of course, the key question is then, how does the rule of law relate to the private
prison? A number of authorities have emphasized the relevance of rule of law
principles in rationalizing the criminal justice system in general. The rule of law is
understood as a basis for the critique of discretion, inequality, and unbounded
26. See HAYEK, supra note 17, at 205-07; Neumann, supra note 16, at 28.
27. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 16, at 29-31. Significantly, Neumann not only posits these norms himself;
he locates them overtly and subtly within the contentions of the rule of law's classical exponents. See also HAYEK,
supra note 17, at 151-53, 209-10.
28. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 16, at 23-26, 31-33.
29. There are numerous salient critiques of the ultimate normative value of the public-private distinction,
particularly in feminist discourse. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step
Away from the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMt L. REv. 379 (1983) (critiquing
public-private distinction in constitutional law as defined primarily by Justice Rehnquist); Ruth Gavison,
Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1992) (discussing "internal" and "external"
elements of the feminist challenge to public-private distinction).
30. On this debate, see, e.g., ScH UERMAN, supra note 25, at 245-48, passim.
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expressions of state power in the institutions of criminal law and criminal
procedure. 3' In fact, some commentators contend that the rule of law directly
forecloses private criminal justice functions.32 It is indeed possible to say that the
rule of law, because it implies the sovereignty of law, vitiates private justice simply
because private persons neither can construct nor implement between themselves
general, formally equal, predictable, and non-retroactive legal norms. 3 3 It also is
possible to argue as well that private law-giving is inconsistent with the insular,
self-contained pretensions of the rule of law. There are indeed many ways to draw
out antitheses between the rule of law and the privatization of law, especially in the
criminal context.
Yet it is in the most fundamental way, I think, that the rule of law speaks
critically to the private prison. My main thesis is as follows: The rule of law
evidences an essential antipathy to sovereignty and a concomitant ambition to
restrain sovereign deeds with subsidiary norms like generality, universality,
separation of powers and so forth. The aspiration behind these norms only can be
realized if the sovereign is, in the first place, a legally and politically transparent
entity with clearly demarcated boundaries. The idea of freedom from sovereignty
that the rule of law claims, requires that the sovereign have definite limits, that
when an institution or person acts, we can know clearly if it or she is the sovereign.
Who, otherwise, is to be restrained from whom? It is in this manner that rule of law
norms presuppose the clear segregation of state from civil and domestic society
and of public from private realms.
It is from such a perspective that Hannah Arendt, in her otherwise problematic
classic, quite accurately defines the absence of the rule of law as a signature aspect
of twentieth century totalitarianism. 34 Among others, 35 Neumann and Kirchheimer
also note how the abrogation of the rule of law provides the legal foundation of
fascism; how, for example, the fascist negation of rule of law norms authorized the
erosion of legal generality and the public-private distinction, and in turn facilitated
a massive interpenetration of public and private realms that featured the state's
domination of private life, the frequent resort to individualized and retroactive
laws, the complete politicization of legal process, and the domination of the state
by private cliques and quasi-public political parties.36
Needless to say, the return of the private prison itself does not necessarily imply
the advent of totalitarianism or fascism or any other kind of far-reaching reconstruc-
tion of our political and legal universe. But inasmuch as the prison is in many
31. See, e.g., FRANCIs A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEoALry: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996);
SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980); cf. Ahmed A. White,
Victims'Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence, 85 KY. L.J. 357 (1999).
32. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 12, at 24.
33. For a recent encounter with this theme, see, e.g., Cotterrell, supra note 25.
34. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM passim (1966).
35. See, e.g., INGO MUELLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991).
36. NEUMAINN, supra note 13, at 286-98.
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respects the quintessence of a state's sovereign function, and inasmuch as the
private prison so thoroughly merges the private and the public and blurs the
boundaries of the sovereign, the private prison cannot help but be antithetical to the
rule of law. Immediately, this exposes the private prison as fundamentally
problematic on at least an abstract, normative plane. Perhaps more critically, I shall
argue that the private prison's concrete problems have roots in a juridical structure
built around the abrogation of the rule of law.
III. LOCATING THE PRIVATE PRISON IN PRACTICE AND IN HISTORY
In order to critique the private prison it is, of course, necessary to define the
institution. Neither the term "prison" nor "private prison" has a self-evident
meaning. Even outside of its many metaphorical usages, the term prison has long
been construed in diverse ways.37 At various points it has contemplated everything
from facilities for detaining juveniles and undocumented immigrants, to "halfway"
houses, to city and county jails housing misdemeanants and those awaiting trial, to
the quintessential "big houses," huge self-contained edifices brimming over with
hardened felons, that continue to dominate the prison landscape.
A. Conceptualizing the Private Prison
It is quite difficult to say what is a prison and what is not. It is surely impossible
to define the prison in a logically or nominally incontestable fashion. This problem
is underscored, it seems, not only by the frequency with which institutions that are,
in one respect or another, non-criminal, non-custodial, non-punitive, or not closely
related to the state are nonetheless described as prisons, but also by the tangled
history of the development of the prison. For legal scholars and social scientists in
particular, the only way to box the meaning of the prison is in effect to conceive of
it through its function, which is to say, to construe the prison as an institution that,
for example, involuntarily confines persons committed by the state to relatively
long terms of incarceration (e.g., one year), for violating the public, criminal
laws.38 For the most part, and not least for reasons of consistency, the present
inquiry adheres to this definition. But much more important to this Article's
critique than any such conceptual details is the idea of prisons, including private
prisons, as fundamentally coercive and implicitly violent places where the sover-
eignty of the state over its citizens, as a prerogative of total control, assumes its
most extreme form (with the probable exceptions of capital punishment and
war-time compulsory military service) and where the hands of the state are always
37. See, e.g., RALPH B. PUGH, IMPRISONMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 87 (1968).
38. See, e.g., DOUGLAS McDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT PRACTICE 10 (ABT Associates 1998); PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1998 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin 1998).
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evident. From this perspective a whole range of prison-like facilities looms equally
problematic vis-A-vis the rule of law, in kind if not also degree.
What makes a prison "private"? Michel Foucault famously defines prisons as
intrinsically "private" in the sense that they secret from view punishment practices
that were heretofore "public" in a parallel sense.39 Whatever the merits of this
formulation, this Article is concerned with private prisons in the proprietary sense,
as institutions that are managed and sometimes owned by non-state entities.
Beyond this, though, the meaning of the private prison remains no more self-
evident than that of the prison as such. The limited character of the state in
American society complicates this issue. To the extent that the state is not
ubiquitous, and that the prison is not entirely hermetic, some aspects of every
prison are always private. From the labor of its employees, to provisions for
inmates' subsistence needs, to the land and capital that comprise the prison's
physical structure, each exemplifies every prison's endemically, if partially, private
character. In this sense, it is only possible to imagine a fully public prison either in
a thoroughly totalitarian society or when the prison itself is (and this would negate
its quality as a prison) an entirely self-contained society.
At the same time, no prison in the contemporary world can be fully private.
Every prison remains intimately connected to the state, incarcerating inmates
arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced by the state for violating the (still) very public
criminal laws and their analogues (for example, juvenile offender laws). In this
sense, the privatization of prisons is much unlike, say, the privatization of steel
mills or utilities or even schools, which may be mandatory and relatively coercive
in operation, but to a much more limited degree than prisons. Another dynamic that
keeps the private prison very public is that private prisons operate exclusively on
revenues derived from the state.
The inherently public aspect of private prisons is a crucial point. It is a principle
argument of this Article that in the final analysis the private prison comprises the
extension and diffusion-and in no way the negation or displacement-of the
sovereignty of the state. As we shall see, this endemic confusion of public and
private ushers the private prison into a state of inevitable illegitimacy.
As a practical matter, both critics and proponents of the private prison tend to
define it as an institution for criminal confinement that is wholly managed and
operated by a private firm. Such a perspective excludes not only the typical public
institutions, but also those that are provisioned in a more extensive but still
piecemeal way by private entities (for example, that out-contract food or laundry
services), as well as institutions whose physical structures are privately owned but
are nonetheless publicly managed or operated.40 As with the matter of the defining
39. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 35-38 (1991).
40. See, e.g., CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 4-5, 238-39 (1990) (comparing private
institutions to those that contract some duties to private companies); DAVID SmCHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT
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the prison, I again accept the impossibility of drawing clear, logically incontestable
lines around the private prison. As the following analysis makes clear, for this
argument it is the degree of private involvement that makes the private prison so
problematic-and not any particular qualitative aspect.
B. The Private Prison in Historical Perspective
Despite its contemporary ubiquity, the prison is a relatively recent fixture in
Western (indeed, every) society. Moreover, from the outset the prison was infused
with private ownership and control, and with private functions, in many respects
quite similar to the contemporary private prison. Only in the nineteenth century did
the prison come to constitute a common mode of criminal sanction in the United
States, and only in the twentieth century did the prison come to comprise a
primarily publicly managed affair. It is fair to say that the prison was private long
before and long after it was, in fact, a prison. This history does much to anticipate
the character of the contemporary private prison, its juridical structure and its
dysfunctions.
The historical development of the prison is utterly steeped in the interpenetra-
tion of the public and private realms in Western society. Although the distinction of
public and private realms was long ago introduced to the Western world in a very
furtive way-for example, appearing in the attempt of the early Roman law to
distinguish public and private wrongs-as a practical, concrete matter the distinc-
tion only really took hold in the nineteenth century, and only then (as countless
realists and critics have indicated) in a most incomplete fashion.4 1 Pre-modern
societies, especially ancient ones, are rather uniformly characterized by the
confusion of public and private realms and, where law itself had attained articulate
form, a confusion of public and private legal norms. Frequently enough, the
underdevelopment of the public-private distinction manifested itself in the juxtapo-
sition of civil and criminal legal regimes and, perhaps even more saliently, in the
juxtaposition of public and private control of the administration of "criminal"
sanctions.42 Only recently in Western society did there exist anything even
14-15 (1995) (discussing forms of private involvement in prisons); J.R. Sevick, Introduction, in CONSTRUCTNG
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: Is THERE A ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 3 (J.R. Sevick & W.I. Cikins eds., 1987).
41. See, e.g., Morton Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1423-24 (1982) (discussing forms of punishment before and during the 19th century) (appearing in a symposium
edition on the public-private distinction).
42. Perhaps the most immediate manifestation of this confusion entailed the virtual merger of tort and criminal
law, which apparently characterized the whole history of primate and ancient legal regimes. See, e.g., A.S.
DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW, PAST AND PRESENT 191-95 (1971) (discussing early civilization's concept of offence to
all and offence to an individual). The classic (if not overused) example of this dynamic is the Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi, which is utterly replete with provisions for private prosecutions, private administration of "criminal"
punishments, and, in some cases, a private, quasi-contractual method for establishing the criminal law.
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approaching a public monopoly of criminal justice functions.4 3 Of course, state-
structured punishments did appear in the pre-modern world, including the Euro-
pean world. But only rarely did this involve any kind of formal, punitive
incarceration, which almost always was used for purposes of criminal and civil
detention, and not for punishment as such. Much more typical were extra-legal
punishments or punishments based on the application of fines and tort-like
sanctions, forced labor, banishment and exile, corporeal punishment, and the
like." These practices were consistent not only with the barbarism of the day but,
more importantly, with existing structural and material realities: the rigid social
relations, the absolute lack of social surplus, and the general shortage of labor in
such societies. In this kind of historical context the prison as we know it-and as
Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer stress-could not assume a central place in
the system of social control.45
When the practice of punishment by incarceration did appear in pre-modern
society, it tended to reflect within itself the prevailing confusion of the public and
private in society as a whole. Almost always, early prisons, which in scale,
function, and internal structure were more like contemporary jails than anything,
either were privately owned or managed, or served transparently private functions,
or both. From its very inception in Western society, the prison was used to achieve
such private ends as the collection of civil debts, the punishment and secreting
away of rivals, and the administration of domestic tyranny.4 6 In medieval Europe,
this tradition played out perhaps most conspicuously in the punitive use of prisons
to maintain order within the essentially private domains of noblemen and clergy.47
In the early modem era, this dynamic prevailed in the use of prisons to detain
upper-class delinquents and the insane.48
To an equal degree, the early prison almost always was a privately owned or
managed affair. Feudal manors maintained prisons that were private in the truest
sense: privately functioning, privately managed, and privately owned.49 From
medieval times through the Industrial Revolution, the maintenance of European
jails tended to be the personal responsibility of local sheriffs and their analogues,
enterprising minor noblemen, or everyday entrepreneurial "keepers." Not just an
obligation, though, this function remained a "business proposition" until at least
the end of the eighteenth century, with the keepers and "franchisees" taking fees
43. See, e.g., MiCHAEL R. WEISSER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 127 (1979) (citing
move of criminal law in the 17th century toward public domain).
44. See ANTHONY BABINGTON, THE POWER TO SILENCE: A HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN 3-6 (1968).
45. See RuscHE & KIRCHEIMER, supra note 7; WEISSER, supra note 43, at 162-63.
46. See, e.g., Edward M. Peters, The Prison Before the Prison, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 3, passim
(1995).
47. See id. at 28-34. See also ANTHONY BABINGTON, THE ENGLISH BASTILLE: A HISTORY OF NEWGATE GOAL
AND PRISON CONDITIONS IN BRITAIN 1188-1902 (1972).
48. See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 49, 68-73 (1995).
49. See PUGH, supra note 37, at 52-53.
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from the state and inmates (or "customers") alike.50 In the sixteenth century in
Europe, there arose an institution that completely merged private (or at least
non-criminal) functions with for-profit management: the so-called "house of
correction." The house of correction, which united under private management the
functions of poorhouse, jail, and manufactuary, also juxtaposed under private
management very minimal public safety functions (as we would now think of
them) with public welfare and labor-control functions."
The private, labor-exploiting character of the house of corrections was not at all
unique among early modem punishments. Convict "transportation," especially,
closely replicated the early prison's thorough juxtaposition of public and private
characteristics. Transportation saw the forced removal of tens of thousands of
"criminals" (and the term has to be used advisedly) from Europe to places like
Australia, North America, and New Caledonia, where they spent their terms
laboring for private contractors, often in the immediate custody of such contrac-
52tors. Other punishment regimes of this time, forced labor on public works and
galley slavery, were not exactly private; yet they too operated on a statist,
mercantilist logic of public profit-making that once again underscored the confu-
sion of public and private in these times and places. 3
In the United States, the confusion of public and private impressed itself into the
history of criminal justice generally, and that of the prison more specifically. In
colonial America, there were no true prisons and very few jails to start with, and
incarceration was rarely resorted to as formal criminal punishment. As in medieval
Europe, labor was too precious, social surpluses too short, and culture too
backwards to justify such institutions.54 Punitive incarceration was not, of course,
unknown. However, as elsewhere, it was subordinate to other practices like
banishment, fines, corporeal punishment, and, of course, outright vigilantism. 5
And where there were jails and prisons, they were typically privately run
operations-especially, it seems, in that even ostensibly public officials derived
their salaries both from fees as well as from charges levied on inmates. 6 As in
Europe, these facilities often took the form of privately-run houses of correc-
57tions.
America generally is regarded as the birthplace of the modem prison-the
50. See id. at 87-113; RuscHE & KiRCHITEIMER, supra note 7, at 62.
51. RuscHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 7, at 42-4; WEISSER, supra note 43, at 164-65. Cf SHICHOR, supra
note 40, at 23 (describing workhouses as places to care for and discipline those considered to be dangerous to
society).
52. RuscHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 7, at 114-19. Cf STEPHEN NicHOLS, CONVICT WORKERS: REINTERPRET-
ING AusTRALIA'S PAST (1989).
53. Spierenburg, supra note 48, at 67.
54. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 48-49 (1993).
55. See, e.g., id. at 74-75, 179-87 (discussing more common forms of punishment such as whipping or
vigilantism).
56. SHICHOR, supra note 40, at 25-26.
57. FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 49.
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prison, that is, as a place for large-scale, long-term, and punitive incarceration.
Indeed, the foundations of the modem prison were set with the inauguration of two
rather distinct models of the "penitentiary": the so-called "Walnut Street" or
"Pennsylvania" system, established in the 1780s; and the "Auburn" or "congre-
gate" system, which grew out of the Walnut Street system early in the nineteenth
century. Both of these systems were premised on a set of common practices,
centered around the segregation of inmates into private cells and the enforcement
of stringent rules of inmate silence. The main difference between the two lay in
their distinct ways of mobilizing inmate labor. The Walnut Street system, which
mandated silence by absolute solitude among inmates, lent itself only to the
minimal, inefficient use of labor (for example, in a manufactuary mode). The
Auburn system retained for a time the Walnut Street system's rules of silence, but
eshewed the institution of absolute solitude in the course of instituting a much
more efficient, collective, factory-like system of labor. The Auburn system thus
gave rise to a set of practices-most notably the mainly nocturnal use of private or
semi-private cells combined with some type of collective labor in the day-which
continue to inform the structure of contemporary prisons worldwide.58
Though still infused with some private characteristics, each model of the penitentiary
marked a significant movement towards the modem, public prison. Both systems also
brought about the segregation of criminal inmates from civil detainees (for example,
debtors). The inefficient Walnut Street system proved especially incompatible with the
profitable employment of inmates, and hence with private management or ownership
structures. 59 And while the Auburn system could profitably employ labor, it was only
rarely that this involved direct private control. Sometimes jurisdictions leased out
inmates to contractors who installed their capital in the prison and directly managed the
inmates' work; more often this system involved a more subtle reduction of erstwhile
public institutions to the logic of private market actors. Under the dominant "piece-price"
system, prison administrators assumed the role of factory managers, organizing the
(hopefully) profitable production of commodities by their inmates.60 The quintessential
big house prisons employed this system to quite profitable ends, selling on the commer-
cial market everything from shoes to furniture until the twentieth century.
6t
At the same time that the rise of the penitentiary marked a move away from the
private prison, other institutions from roughly the same period show just the
opposite movement. Most obvious in this regard are the punitive aspects of
Southern slavery. In many ways, slave plantations in the antebellum South were
58. For an overview of the development of these prisons, see, e.g., Matthew W. Meskell, Note, History of
Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. Rev, 839 (1999).
59. See MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFoRMAToRIEs, AND CHAIN GANGS: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE
HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 60-61 (1997). Cf. Paul Takaki, The Walnut Street
Jail: A Penal Reform to Centralize the Power of the State, in PUNISHMENT AND PENAL DISCIPLINE 48 (Tony Platt &
Paul Takaki eds., 1980).
60. COLVIN, supra note 59, at 96-98.
61. RuscHE & KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 7, at 130-31; SHICHOR, supra note 40, at 28-34.
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private prisons unto themselves. Masters and mistresses retained wide authority by
custom and law to discipline their "properties" for all manner of deed, criminal or
otherwise. Of course, slave owners did not entirely monopolize criminal justice
functions with respect to their slaves, but they nearly did so, and the exceptions_
for example, the modest and usually ineffective legal limits on owners' disciplin-
ary prerogatives-mainly prove the rule.6 2 In such a social system, incarceration
exacted direct costs in lost labor, fines were utterly inapplicable, and public
punishments of all sorts implied a loss of slaves' services and an abrogation of
owner's prerogative. Accordingly, the punishment of slaves most often took the
form of corporeal punishment, extra work, and punitive resort to the slave auction,
all privately administered.63
In the postbellum South, until at least the 1940s, the practice of substituting the
plantation for the penitentiary continued in the guise of several different forced
labor regimes. Among the more salient examples of these was the so-called
"criminal-surety" system, whereby "criminal" offenders (for example, those who
were "convicted" of violating very dubious vagrancy, petty larceny, or trespassing
laws) typically were afforded the "opportunity" to exchange future labor for
payment of their fines and "court costs" by local landowners and capitalists.
Sometimes formal, statutorily authorized outcome of convictions, sometimes
informal and the result of pretrial plea-bargaining, the result was always the same:
reduction to peonage as criminal punishment (or, more accurately, criminal
sanction as a source of peonage). The offender usually was bound to remain and
labor at his surety's establishment for months or even years earning minimal wages
against his debt.64
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 52-53. See also PHILIP J. ScHwARz, TWICE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND CRIMINAL
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1705-1865 141-44 (1988).
63. American slavery, it turns out, anticipated the private prison in another key respect: as a formal substitute
for the other contemporary punishments levied on erstwhile free blacks. Throughout slave-holding states, free
blacks who ran afoul of the law (again, criminal or otherwise) were sometimes subject to being sold into private
slavery. See, e.g., ROBERT B. SHAw, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNrrED STATES 34, 38-45 (1991); A.
Leon Higginbotham & Anne F Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimation of Racial Powerlessness
Through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REv. 969, 978 (1992). See also
Negro Ann Marie Cornish v. State, 15 Md. 208 (1860) (free black person guilty of larceny subject to in-state
enslavement, but not sale abroad); Ponder v. Cox, 26 Ga. 485 (1858) (black person enslaved on criminal
conviction not guilty of illegally coming into Georgia when involuntarily brought into the state by owner).
64. William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S.
LEGAL HIST. 31, 53-55 (1976); see generally DANIEL A. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR
AFTER SLAVERY (1978); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (finding an Alabama regime of this kind
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the Anti-Peonage Act). In Reynolds, the peon, one Ed Rivers,
a black man, had been convicted of petty larceny and fined $15, plus court costs of $43.75. One J.A. Reynolds
then appeared as surety on behalf of Rivers, paying offthe state and getting Rivers out ofjail. In exchange for this
act, Rivers signed a written contract to work for almost ten months at $6 a month. After several weeks of this,
Rivers quit, only to be rearrested and assessed additional costs of $87.05 (plus a 1 cent fine), for which he
"confessed judgement with G.W. Broughton" and agreed to work for Broughton for over fourteen months at the
same rate of $6 a month. id. at 140. All of this was expressly permitted by Alabama statute.
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IV. THE CONVICT LEASE SYSTEM AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION
The most thorough link between criminal justice and private interests in the
American experience is the convict lease system. The most significant of the
several postbellum forced labor regimes, 65 the convict lease system also perhaps
best anticipates the juridical structure of the contemporary private prison. Like the
contemporary private prison, convict leasing was premised on the simultaneous
extension and diffusion of state sovereignty and the interpenetration of public and
private realms. Similarly, convict leasing anticipates an organic relationship
between this perversion of sovereignty, on the one hand, and the objectively
problematic tendencies that seem to inhere in all private prisons, including the
contemporary private prison, on the other.
Though, to be sure, tried in some northern and western states, and established in
some cases prior to the Civil War, the convict lease system came into its own in
postbellum southern states.66 Every southern state after the Civil War, except
Virginia, eventually instituted the widespread leasing of state inmates to private
individuals or firms. The practice continued at the state level into the 1920s (in
Alabama and Florida). Apart from this-and probably well into the civil rights
era-uncounted local governments in the South (usually sheriffs in some corrupt
capacity) resorted to leasing their county prisoners.67 In every case, the essence of
the institution remained the same: the leasing out of convicted persons to private
contractors who then acquired the right to use convicts' labor for commercial
purposes. In Louisiana and Kentucky, the whole prison systems were leased out to
single parties. Lessees usually assumed complete de facto custody of the state's
convicts, organizing their work as well as providing for their subsistence, disci-
pline, security, and so forth.68 Quite frequently, convicts were even subleased-
often illegally and sometimes multiple times.
69
Apparently only Georgia and Alabama formally sanctioned the criminal-surety system on the state level.
However, the practice was quite widespread as an informal and local practice. See Cohen, supra, at 55.
Not unrelated to this practice were those that made private plantation labor the end result not so much of
criminal sanction, but of criminal deterrence. For example, most postbellum Southern states enacted labor
contract enforcement regimes, as well as "anti-enticement" statutes, each of which attempted to criminalize the
abrogation of labor contracts and to bind blacks to the soil. In each of these practices the lines between public and
private, between criminal and civil, were, to say the least, strained. See generally id.
65. MATTH-w MANcmI, ONE DIEs, GET ANOTHER 14-15 (1996).
66. Apparently, Massachusetts briefly tried convict leasing in 1798, Kentucky did so in the 1820s, Oregon in
1859, Missouri sporadically from the 1850s through the 1870s, and California over a similar period. Each of these
experiments, though, proved disastrous. MANCmn', supra note 65, at 5. Apparently, too, convict leasing was also
tried in Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma in the years following the civil war. Malcolm M. Feeley, The
Privatization of Prisons in Historical Perspective, 6 ClM. JUST. RES. BULL. 1, 5 (1991).
67. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 55-57; E. STAGG WHrriN, PENAL SERvrrTUDE 33-38 (1912).
68. MANcI , supra note 65, at 15.
69. In fact, it seems that subleasing was the norm and not the exception. Such an arrangement allowed
well-placed elites, once they acquired the initial contracts, to multiply their profits, whilst avoiding the direct risks
and costs of managing the convicts' labor. See MANcNI, supra note 65, passim.
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A. The Juridical Structure of Convict Leasing
Despite its private aura, convict leasing clearly represents the extension of state
sovereign functions. The rise of leasing facilitated a massive expansion of criminal
authority in the states that practiced it and accounted for massive increases in their
incarceration rates. Likewise, even though corruption and outright underpayment
of lease obligations were constant drains, leasing states benefited handsomely
from their contracts. On average, leasing generated revenues several times the
costs. At one point, for example, Alabama derived six to ten percent of its total
state revenues from leasing 7T-and this in contrast to the prospect of actually
paying for incarceration. Indeed, aside from the generation of revenues, leasing
performed several other crucial functions in postbellum Southern society that in
the wake of slavery were otherwise devolving to the state, including the political
control of blacks and the affirmation of segregation; the re-mobilization as well as
the "proletarianization" of black labor; the deflation of wage-rates generally; and
the development of public infrastructure. 71
However, leasing did not comprise merely the extension of state sovereignty.
Leasing also was based on the direct penetration of private powers, interests, and
norms into an erstwhile public mode for the expression of sovereignty. The convict
leasing system was, in other words, a means of spreading, or diffusing, the
sovereignty of the state. This dynamic is manifest on one level on the institution's
surface: with the fact that lessees themselves simultaneously discharged the state's
penological functions and remained at the same time private actors, profiting
directly from the labor of their leased convicts and doing for the most part as they
pleased with the convicts. But this is not all. It is important to understand the
sovereignty-diffusing aspects of convict leasing in terms of at least three less
obvious dynamics: (1) in the legal ambiguity that surrounded the leasing regimes;
(2) in the lessees' extensive control over the political and especially criminal
process; and (3) in evidence of the lessees' own attempts to wield comprehensive,
archaic sovereignty over their charges.
Lessees' manipulation of the political and criminal processes is perhaps most
obvious of these dynamics. Across the South, the introduction of convict leasing
corresponded with the enactment of substantive criminal laws that clearly appear
to have been tailored to increase dramatically the number of young, able-bodied
black men available for lease.72 The criminal justice systems of leasing states were
"systematically geared for the collection of [black] labor.' 7 3 In at least some cases
70. EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTuRY AMERICAN
SoUTH 196 (1984); MANCTUr, supra note 65, at 102, 112-13, 179-80.
71. On the various functions of convict leasing, see ALEx LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONvIcr LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH 82, 87-104, 163-64 (1996). See also AYERS, supra
note 70, at 191-95, 212-13.
72. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 71, at 85-86.
73. MANCINI, supra note 65, at 41.
[Vol. 38:111
THE PRIVATE PRISON IN JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE
this result was actually the product of overt lobbying to change the criminal laws
to benefit well-placed lessees.74 Indeed, lessees were also quite able to influence
the administration of the criminal law in ways that further guaranteed a healthy
supply of "hands"-where convicts labored in agriculture, for example, the
enforcement of the criminal law assumed a seasonal character, as it were.75 In
Mississippi, the lessees were so influential within that state's political and legal
systems that the formal prohibition of leasing in the state constitution not only was
circumvented, but also ignored so completely that within several years of its
ratification, the number of leased inmates had doubled.
7 6
To say that the enterprise of convict leasing was corrupt in more traditional ways
can only be an understatement. Corruption was utterly intrinsic to the perverse
juridical structure of convict leasing, comprising not an isolated aspect of leasing,
but the functional essence of the system's blurring of the line between the public
and private. In the words of historian Edward Ayers, "The convict lease system
became a sort of mutual aid society for the new breed of capitalists and politicians
of the white Democratic regimes of the New South."7 7 Bribes were quite common
and the lease contracts invariably went to well placed firms or individuals-
including, remarkably enough, characters who had sometimes already bilked their
state under earlier agreements. 78 Lessees everywhere notoriously underpaid the
state under their contracts.79 In other cases they aggressively disputed obvious
contractual terms.80 This is not surprising. According to historian David Oshinsky,
in Mississippi, the lease was the "most prized political contract"; and in Georgia,
for example, "political office-holding, as opposed to simple influence, became the
prerequisite for winning a lease."8 As Ayers points out, it was common every-
where that "the same man played the roles of both entrepreneur and officeholder":
governors, senators, party bosses, and the like predominated among lessees. He
notes, for example, that:
Although Joseph Emerson Brown had called for the abolition of a centralized
penitentiary when he was governor of Georgia in 1865, he made a fortune
leasing convicts when he was senator in the 1880s. Jeremiah W. South, lessee
74. In Arkansas, for example, a principal lessee, Zebulon Ward, was able to bribe the state legislature (with
barbecues, among other things) into revising the criminal law so as to dramatically increase the number of inmates
available for lease. MANcINI, supra note 65, at 119-20.
75. Id. at 24, 42, 197; see also Cohen, supra note 64, at 50-51. This aspect of convict leasing is consistent with
the criminal law's assumption of seasonal tendencies in other forced labor contexts. RuscHE & KIRCHEIMER,
supra note 7, passim.
76. See MANCtm, supra note 65, at 17-18.
77. AYERS, supra note 70, at 195.
78. See MANcI, supra note 65, at 132-33.
79. See id. at 88, 100, 137-38.
80. See State v. James, 16 So. 751-52 (La. 1895) (holding that the state should collect $6,000 that the lessee
was supposed to pay under the original lease against the salaries of minor officials).
81. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY 63-64 (1996).
2001]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
of Kentucky convicts from 1869 to his death in 1880, supposedly exercised
greater power over Kentucky's government than any other official, controlling
a third of the legislators 'as absolutely as he controlled the convicts.' A political
dynasty sprang from convict labor in Alabama, where John H. Bankhead
ruled.8 2
It also should be observed that in several cases, at least, public opponents of
leasing were assassinated-with predictably minimal consequences for their
murderers.8 3 One opponent-or at least, semi-opponent--of leasing actually was
murdered inside the Georgia treasurer's office amidst a quarrel with another
"gentleman" over leasing !84
A more subtle dynamic-at least less noticeable to historians-is that of the
considerable ambiguity surrounding the legal status of convict leasing. The
reported cases suggest that Southern courts were rather unclear about the legal
standing of leasing and suggest further that the basis of this confusion lay with the
relationship between convict leasing and sovereignty. A particular source of
confusion for courts in this context was the seemingly simple matter of determin-
ing where the state began and ended. This problem was especially salient and
vexing with regard to liability issues.8 5 A common matter for appellate courts to
resolve was whether leased convicts were employees subject to contemporary
master-servant obligations, or whether, instead, they were mere inmates and
lessees the functional equivalents of public jailers. Some courts tended to embrace
the latter position.16 Others, usually to the benefit of the lessees, embraced the
former position. To this end, a few lessees were able successfully to argue that,
inasmuch a state retained (only) formal control of the convicts, this vitiated the
lessees' control and therefore any tort liability for injury to the convicts . 7
The exploitation of ambiguity was not confined to cases involving injury to
convicts. For example, a lessee who allowed an inmate to escape-an absolute
epidemic with leasing-was able to avoid liability to a third party injured by the
inmate by successfully invoking the general immunity of jailers. 88 In another case
concerning liability to the state for escapes, the South Carolina Supreme Court was
82. AYERS, supra note 70, at 195.
83. See MANCINI, supra note 65, at 87, 138-40; OSHINSKY, supra note 81, at 49-50.
84. Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374 (1979) (discovering that the murder occurred because the erstwhile opponent of
the leasing was interested in obtaining a lease for himself).
85. See Cunningham & Ellis v. Moore et al., 55 Tex. 373 (1881) (holding lessee not liable for death caused by
defective bunk bed where bed supposedly was in control of state's officers).
86. See Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Braswell, 18 S.E. 1015 (Ga. 1893) (holding inmate not a servant for
purpose of tort action against lessee arising out of employment).
87. See Mason v. Hamby & Toomer, 64 S.E. 569 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909) (holding that the primary duty of
protecting the convicts was upon the state itself); Cunningham & Ellis, 55 Tex. at 373 (finding that nominal
retention of state "control" vitiated lessee liability for injury to inmates). Cf St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Boyle, 83
Ark. 302 (1907) (holding company not liable for tortious act of state convict).
88. Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 28 S.E. 251 (Ga. 1897) (holding that as a general rule, jailers are not liable in
damages for a criminal tort committed by a convict).
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compelled to recognize the lease contract-and neither "public policy" nor the
"relations of the parties"-as the only determinate of liability.89 In one particularly
absurd case, a lessee attempting to evade stipulated fines for allowing escapes was
reduced to arguing (unsuccessfully) that the escapees should not, legally, have
been inmates in the first place !90 Almost as absurd, another lessee who had kept an
inmate beyond his release date was able successfully to argue that unlike a public
jailer, the lessee had no positive duty to release the inmate-the court found the
lessee's only duty to lie in tort.91 In still another case, the Alabama Supreme Court
had to decide a habeas petition where the inmate was rearrested by the sheriff after
simply being set free by a lessee who no longer needed his labor.
92
In numerous other cases, courts were required to engage in the dubious chore of
sorting out the obligations of lessees who were themselves either presently or not
far removed from major public office. For example, one-time U.S. Senator and
Governor Joseph E. Brown (mentioned above by Ayers), as well as Governor John
B. Gordon, both of Georgia and both heavily involved in leasing, figure as lessees
in the case of Georgia Penitentiary Companies Nos. 2 & 3 v. Nelms93-the case
principally concerned the legality of leasing as such. The same Governor Gordon
appears again in a private capacity in Gordon v. Mitchell,94 where the issue was
specifically the validity of convict subleasing. Of course, courts have always
routinely heard cases involving elites-one might even argue that such is the
raison-d'Otre of civil justice. What makes this phenomenon important and trou-
bling in these cases is that the underlying issue remains the most extreme kind of
restraint and exploitation, with state sanction, of virtually helpless persons.
Certainly on some occasions, lessees' political influence trumped formal author-
ity at the highest levels of state government. In Henry v. Mississippi,95 the
Mississippi Supreme Court confronted the claim by a district attorney and the
Governor's office that the "Sandy Bayou Plantation" was a lease regime in
violation of the state's 1890 constitution, which on its face prohibited convict
leasing. This is the case that ultimately sanctioned the above-mentioned circumven-
89. Lipscomp v. Seegers, 22 S.C. 407, 409 (1885) (holding that because convicts were leased under contract
required by state, contractor's liability was fixed and could not be measured by relations of the parties or supposed
public policy).
90. Penitentiary Co. No. 2 v. Gordon, 11 S.E. 584, 585 (Ga. 1890) (holding that receipt by prison company of
inmates from penitentiary created presumption that prisoners were properly convicted and sentenced).
91. See Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Goings, 69 S.E. 865, 868 (Ga. 1910) (holding that lessee who knowingly
detained convict beyond term of his sentence committed a tort).
92. McQueen v. State, 30 So. 414 (Ala. 1901) (holding that even if it does not appear that criminal is rearrested
during escape, the order of the judge denying the discharge is free from error).
93, 71 Ga. 301 (1884) (holding constitutional and valid the governor's right to lease convicts to penitentiary
companies).
94. 68 Ga. 11 (1881) (holding illegal any contract to sublet, sublease or hire out convicts leased from the state).
Cf. Lockett v. Georgia, 61 Ga. 44 (1878) (rejecting lessee's claim that he was an "officer" of the state and exempt
from jury duty).
95. 39 So. 856 (Miss. 1906).
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tion of Mississippi's constitution. The majority of the court ultimately upheld the
legality of the operation on the basis of a rather creative-not to mention
apparently counterfactual-distinction between a "state farm" (which was legal)
and a "convict farm" (which was illegal). The substance of the court's reasoning
was that the lessee, H.J. McLaurin, had only leased to the state the land on his
plantation, and had not himself leased the convicts from the state. One obvious
problem with this contention is that McLaurin actually paid the state $25,000
annually for the labor of the convicts, and then was entitled to pocket the rest of the
operation's revenues. McLaurin also was required to furnish, inter alia, the
necessary mules and teams for working of the said plantation, and feed for same,
and also to furnish all wagons and farming implements and planting seeds. Of
course, McLaurin was supposed to leave control of the convicts to the state-this,
in fact, was the basis of the court's determination in McLaurin's favor that the
arrangement was not a lease. But as in so many of these cases, it seems likely that
the lessee did not at all abdicate control of the convicts-they lived on his
plantation and labored under his ultimate control.96
Not unrelated to this legal mess occasioned by the intermixing of public and
private was the prevalence of a more mundane and brutal kind of private
sovereignty that the states ceded to lessees and then proved unwilling or unable to
control. Almost always, leasing meant incredible levels of torture, privation, and
overwork that provoked contemporary comparisons to slavery, feudalism, and
czarist gulags.97 Lessees set their convicts to work at tasks that free laborers not
only would not perform as cheaply, but often would not perform at all. Brick-
making, coal mining, turpentine gathering, cotton farming, and levee maintenance
were favorite applications. Often enough, these operations developed into elabo-
rate potentates. "Major" S.L. James ran the Louisiana penal system for many years
at his massive plantation, "Angola," which eventually became the state peniten-
tiary that retains the name. 98 "Colonel" James Monroe Smith's "Smithonia"
plantation in Georgia, worked by leased convicts, featured no less than six schools,
a post office and hotel, sawmill, and a general store.99 Rates of injury, illness, and
death were consistent with the inherently dangerous nature of these jobs as well as
with the utter disposability of the convicts in the eyes of their greedy, racist, and
just plain sadistic keepers. Annual death rates under some lessees approached fifty
percent, 1' and rates over ten percent seem to have been quite normal.' 0 ' Such
96. Id. (holding that a contract whereby a penitentiary agreed to staff a plantation with convicts was a lease and
not a hiring of the convicts by the owner); State v. Henry, 40 So. 152 (Miss. 1906) (same); MANCINI, supra note
65, at 142-43.
97. See, e.g., MANciN, supra note 65, at 33-34; WrrmN, supra note 67, at 1-3.
98. See MARK T. CARLETON, POLITICS AND PUNISHMENT: THE HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA STATE PENAL SYSTEM
135-66 (1971).
99. OSHiNSKY, supra note 81, at 65-67.
100. See SHICHOR, supra note 40, at 36.
101. See MANclNI, supra note 65, at 66-67.
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mortality rates far exceed those typical of slavery (where even the most barbaric
masters retained a direct proprietary interest in the survival of their slaves) as well
as those of contemporary northern prisons. 10 2 These pervasively atrocious condi-
tions speak again to another dimension of the lessee's sovereignty: their extensive
control over the political and legal systems. Unless the state or some other elite
was affected, lessees and their agents almost never sustained any criminal or civil
liability for their gross misdeeds. '
0 3
B. Rule of Law and Convict Leasing
Convict leasing finally came to an end on the state level in the 1920s, yet it was
not until the conclusion of the civil rights era that it was completely abolished on
the county level. The reasons for leasing's demise are many, but seem to center
around the displacement of the underlying modes of production and the political
agitation of free laborers and excluded businessmen."
'Contrary to the intimations of some commentators, I do not regard leasing as the
genetic basis or direct-institutional equivalent of the contemporary private prison.'0 5
In fact, there is a vital structural difference between the contemporary private
prison and the convict lease system. Although leasing involved the purchase of
inmate labor by the private party, the contemporary private prison involves the
state's payment to the private prison in exchange for merely keeping the in-
mates.16 Nevertheless, I think it clear that convict leasing does anticipate in a very
substantial way the problematic characteristics of the contemporary private prison.
In order to appreciate this association, it is important to emphasize the deep
interconnection between the absence of rule of law norms and the signature aspects
of convict leasing. The foregoing account makes clear that the problematic
characteristics of convict leasing, including the aggregation of state power,
corruption, legal ambiguity, and anarchical private sovereignty, were clearly
fundamental to convict leasing and to its key raisons d'etre: political repression
and proletarianization of blacks, profiteering by local elites, cheap development of
state infrastructure, and the like. Also clear is that the perverse, anti-rule of law
juridical structure that accompanied convict leasing-the merger of public and
private, and the simultaneous extension and diffusion of sovereignty-was equally
102. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 56.
103. See MANCLN, supra note 65, 59-77.
104. On the demise of convict leasing, see LiCHTENSTEIN, supra note 71, at 126-87.
105. See W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional Institutions: The Tennessee
Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829, 846-849 (1987) (drawing parallels between Tennessee's old convict leasing
system and its contemporary experiences).
106. This difference is less consequential in a practical sense: each system holds mutual economic advantages
to state and private parties. In the convict leasing system, the state enjoys reduced costs and splits labor-generated
profits with the lessees; with the contemporary private prison the state and the proprietor split not labor revenues,
but tax revenues.
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fundamental to the institution. As we have seen, the absence of rule of law norms
provided a juridical climate in which the aggregation of state power, corruption,
and the like, could subside in a more or less legally unproblematic fashion. In light
of convergence, it seems evident that the relationship between convict leasing and
the absence of rule of law norms was not merely accidental, nor even simply
functional, but rather of organic proportions. 10 7 The next section illustrates how
the same unfortunate relationship reappears with the modem private prison.
V. THE CONTEMPORARY PRIVATE PRISON AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION
For a relatively brief period from about the 1940s through the 1970s, public
entities enjoyed a near monopoly in the business of incarceration. This situation
came to an end in the mid-1980s on a broader wave of privatization and a surge in
American incarceration rates. The first modem county-level privatization contract
was established in 1984 and the first state-level contract in 1985. Between three
and six percent of inmates nationwide are now incarcerated in privately run
facilities, for a total of about 120,000 inmates in about 150 facilities. Several states
and the District of Columbia incarcerate at least fifteen percent of their inmates in
private prisons. Today the industry is dominated by two corporations, Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA); together
they control over two-thirds of the market. The industry's annual gross revenues
probably exceed $1 billion.'O8
A. Conventional Critiques of the Private Prison
At least one recent poll of national scope (albeit commissioned by a union represent-
ing public prison employees) claims to demonstrate significant public skepticism about
private prisons. 1 9 General popular sentiment as well as a plethora of editorial pieces
seems to confirm this attitude. In fact, from its resurgence in the 1980s, the private prison
has been subjected to a number of more or less scholarly critiques. These critiques, which
of course transcend the critique of criminal punishment as such, can be grouped in three
overlapping categories: (1) those that focus on the private prison's practical or "perfor-
mance" shortcoming; (2) those that point to the private prison's legally problematic
characteristics; and (3) those that deem private prisons inherently problematic on a
normative, usually moral or ethical, plane. A review of these perspectives reveals that,
107. See AYERS, supra note 70, passim (focusing throughout on the pervasiveness of this state of affairs,
especially as manifested in the prevalence of extra-legal punishments).
108. On the parameters of this industry, see, e.g., Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW.
359, 370-72 (1996); McDONALD Er AL., supra note 38. As mentioned above, the most current information of this
kind is available through the Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, the University of Florida, at
http://web.crim.ufl.edu/pcp (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
109. See PRIVATE PRISON SURVEY (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 1999), at
http://www.afscme.org/private/lake.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2000).
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while each is often quite useful, they remain inadequate to a thorough critique of the
private prison.
Practical criticisms of the private prison center on questions of performance-
that is, on the ability of these prisons to achieve, for example, greater efficiency
than their public counterparts or otherwise to provide adequate services measured
in levels of violence and abuse, recidivism, and fiscal costs and relative to public
prisons."'° Perhaps the most common variant of this critique focuses on a proposed
contradiction between the provision of quality services of any kind and the
financial self-interests of private prison contractors."' Though many performance
issues remain unresolved, there is more than ample evidence that private prisons
are not dramatically more efficient than public institutions1 12 and have struggled to
provide services even equal to that of public prisons.113 Aside from the underdevel-
oped state of the debate, the only thing consistently problematic about such
critiques is that, whatever the focus, they consistently fail to connect narrow
failings to fundamental jurisprudential problems.
Much the same can be said of typical legal critiques of the private prison. These
critiques frequently focus on whether the private prison violates constitutional
constructs like the so-called non-delegation doctrine, the due process clauses, or
the Thirteenth Amendment.' 14 In other cases, critics confront the private prison's
relationship to traditional liability doctrines, both state and federal, statutory and
common law.'1 5 Indeed, the 1997 Supreme Court decision, Richardson v. Mc-
Knight, 116 which squarely confronted the question of private prison guards's
entitlement to the privilege of qualified immunity in the context of § 1983 actions,
apparently accounts for the majority of recent legal commentaries on this topic. 117
110. See, e.g., Douglas C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). Cf Eric Bates, CCA, the
Sequel: The Largest Private Prison Firm Continues Pattern ofAbuse, NATION, June 7, 1999, at 22-23.
111. See SHIcHOR, supra note 40, at 135-65 (reviewing the literature on this question); Todd Mason, For Profit
Jails: A Risky Business, in PRIvATIZiNG CORRECIONAL INSTITUTIONS 163 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993). But
see Charles H. Logan, The Propriety of Proprietary Prisons, 51 FED. PROBATION 35, 38 (1987).
112. See PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATONAL COSTs AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE
(General Accounting Office, GPO 1996).
113. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA 221-25 (1999)
114. See, e.g., Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of American Prison Privatization Statutes, 30 SETON
HALL L. REV. 371 (1997); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35
UCLA L. REV. 911 (1988); Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of
Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987).
115. See, e.g., IRA P. ROBBINS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE INCARCERATION (1988); Michael Walzer,
Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1985, at 12. Cf. West Virginia Debates Private Prison Constitutionality,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 4, 1996, available at 1996 WL 690697.
116. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
117. See, e.g., Robert Trant, Comment, Richardson v. McKnight: Are Private Prison Operators Engaged in
State Action for Purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983?, 25 NEWENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 577 (1999); Brett
R. Carter, Civil Rights-Richardson v. McKnight: The Rise and Fall of Prison Guards' Qualified Immunity, 28 U.
MEM. L. REV. 611 (1998); David Lemkemeier, Withholding Qualified Immunity from Private Prison Guards: A
Costly Mistake, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 345 (1998).
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Other items of concern in this area include the matter of access to private prison
records and the legal issues engendered by intervening- or cross-jurisdictional
private prisons.18 Again, the problem with such critiques is not an intrinsic one.
As we shall see, the recurrence and relative insolubility of liability questions in the
private prison context is an important premise of my own critique. The problem is
rather a failure to connect narrow failings to fundamental jurisprudential problems.
More jurisprudential in spirit, if not in execution, are the numerous attempts to paint
the private prison as something that is inherently obnoxious on general normative
grounds. As often as not, the notion that private prisons are intrinsically improper appears
in journalistic, usually editorial accounts." 9 These efforts are remarkable both for their
great conviction and, unfortunately, for their persistent failure to engage legal and
therefore jurisprudential issues. The same is true of more sophisticated, scholarly efforts.
For example, such arguments by neo-conservative political theorist and penologist John
Dilulio (the Princeton scholar who introduced the term "super-predator' to criminologi-
cal discourse) against privatization are quite intricate and provocative and appear to have
wielded some influence, at least in academic circles. Nonetheless, Dilulio's arguments
are couched in moral claims that he rigorously separates from practical and legal
questions. For this reason, Dilulio's work, too, remains largely inconsistent with a truly
effective jurisprudential approach. 20 Inadequacies of the same kind characterize the few
"ethical" critiques that have been raised in this literature, including a notable effort by
Richard Lippke, 12 1 as well as the American Bar Association's policy statement against
private prisons. 122 Of course, in my view the private prison is normatively problematic.
But once again, I think it deficient not to connect normative claims to objective problems.
In sum, the main problems with the existing critiques of the private prison
consist of a failure to deal with the juridical implications of the private prison and
thus a failure to couch the private prison's implications in a discussion about the
118. See, e.g., Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections:
The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 303 (1995) ("Although records
promulgated by federal correctional agencies are subject to public disclosure under the FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act], documents maintained by private operators are largely inaccessible under the Act. By
contrasting with private prison operators, federal correctional agencies shield what otherwise would have been
public information from public scrutiny. This frustrates FOIA's purpose of guaranteeing the public the right to
monitor government activities.").
For an excellent and relatively up to date review of the legal aspects of private prisons, see MCDONALD ET AL.,
supra note 38, at App. 3.
119. See, e.g., Lock Up Private Prisons: Chronic Problems Demonstrate Why Incarceration Should Be Left to
the State, Editorial, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 6, 1999, at A22; Keep State's Prison out of Private Hands, Editorial,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 13, 1998, at A20; Private Prisons: Whole Concept is Wrong, Editorial, CHARLESTON
GAzmTE & DAILY MAIL, June 4, 1999, atA4.
120. See John 1. Dilulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the Private Management of Prisons
and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 155 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., Rutgers 1990). Dilulio's
approach is especially important for stressing the inadequacy of strictly practical and legal approaches.
121. See, e.g., Richard L. Lippke, Thinking About Private Prisons, 16 CiM. JUST. ETHICS 26 (1997).
122. AMERIcAN BAR AssocIATIoN, SEcTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON
PRIVATE PRISONS (ABA 1986).
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way that the law mediates, or fails to mediate, the relationship between state and
society. Likely, it is a consequence of these shortcomings that the existing
literature is so fractured, that normative critiques remain disconnected from
practical and legal critiques, while practical and legal critiques are disconnected
from normative failures. For, as I have mentioned, it is the essence of jurispruden-
tial discourse to draw out the connections among these issues, to see, for example,
in the connection between practical and legal dysfunctions and erstwhile abstract
normative failings. To eschew jurisprudential critique is therefore to guarantee not
only that important questions about the fate of sovereignty are not discussed in the
context of the private prison, but also that the fractured character of the debate is
not mended into a comprehensive critique.
B. The Contemporary Private Prison and the Perversion of Sovereignty
The key to a thoroughly critical understanding of the private prison lies with its
relationship to sovereignty. The private prison represents neither the straightfor-
ward retreat of sovereignty, nor its outright expansion. Rather, the private prison is
fundamentally premised on a dynamic that combines these tendencies, that seems
to represent both the apparent retreat and the advance of the state in the prison
context. It is in this sense that private prisons must be understood in terms of the
extension and diffiusion of sovereignty.
Commenting broadly on criminal justice issues, Stanley Cohen argues force-
fully that the coerciveness of the state consistently is expanded by apparently
progressive reforms that blur spatial boundaries between state and society, obscure
channels of ownership and control, and conceal the identity of state actors. For
Cohen, even reforms that seem to mark the retreat of the state and its appetite for
control (for example, the development of "community controls" and halfway
houses, and the extension of parole) almost invariably augment (as opposed to
displace) existing mechanisms of punishment and ultimately expand state preroga-
tives. 3 A similar logic inheres in the relationship of the contemporary private
prison to sovereignty.
The sovereignty-extending character of the private prison is obvious. The
prison, any prison, is an extreme representation of the sovereign prerogative of the
state. The private prison is not only a prison, it is (or at least it claims to be) a kind
of perfect prison: a more efficient and more effective version of the institution and
thus a more efficient and effective articulation of state control. Consistent with this
aspect, the rise of the private prison has in no way slowed the rate of incarceration
or reduced the scope of the criminal justice system-quite the contrary.'24 When
seen in this light, the private prison immediately appears as a development that
123. CoHEN, supra note 4, at 56-86.
124. Because the private prison is marked by both the extension and retreat of the state, it is quite inaccurate to
paint the institution in libertarian colors. The private prison movement is heavily populated by conservative, right
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contradicts the most fundamental ideal behind the rule of law: that of absolutely
minimizing the coercive prerogative of the state.
Though troubling, by no means does this straightforward conflict with the rule of law
mark the extent of the private prison's problematic character. Perhaps more insidiously,
the private prison's characteristic interpenetration of public and private translates into a
persistent confusion regarding the legal rules that apply to private prisons. As with
convict leasing, clear examples of this kind arise around the question of liability. Section
1983 actions are the primary vehicle for the vindication of prisoners' rights, in particular
those concerning conditions of confinement. McKnight resolved negatively the then-
unanswered question of whether private prison guards could avail themselves of the
"qualified immunity" privilege generally available to state actors who reasonably believe
their conduct to be lawful.' 25 To some extent, McKnight has clarified the issues and
generally increased the likelihood that private prison operators and their agents will be
subject to viable inmate lawsuits. But key questions remain unclear, for example,
whether such causes of action are equally viable in the federal context (i.e., as Bivens
actions). Also unclear is the extent to which the so-called "good faith" defense is
available to private prisons in § 1983 cases.1 26 Although it is rather well-settled that
private prisons constitute state action sufficient to form a basis for such causes of
action,"' it is not at all clear whether any specific deed committed by a private prison or
its agents constitutes state action. Although this problem of defining the limits of state
action is endemic to civil rights jurisprudence, it seems aggravated in this case by the
proliferation of non-state functions and actors in the private prison.
128
Just as problematic and unclear in the Wake of McKnight is the scope of
government liability. There is good reason to anticipate that under present law the
private prison has the effect of insulating the state from liability and thus legal
accountability. This follows not least from the fact that § 1983 generally does not
trigger the application of the principle of respondeat superior.129 In the normal
public prison context this situation is problematic enough for its diffusion of
wing figures who frequently identify the privatization of prisons with minimalist-state rhetoric of the privatization
movement more generally.
Among libertarian characterizations of the private prison, see CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: PROS AND
CONS (Oxford 1990); Omega Project, in JUSTICE PROJECT (Adam Smith Institute 1984). Among notable
neo-conservatives who have played a hand in the prison privatization movement are former Attorney General
Edwin Meese, former advisor to President Reagan, Frank Carlucci, and the late Jorge Mas Conosa of the Cuban
exile community. See PARENTI, supra note 113, at 219.
125. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
126. See, e.g., MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, App. 3, at 16-18.
127. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Payne v. Monroe County, 779 F. Supp. 1330 (M.D. Fla.
1991). See also Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1991).
128. See, e.g., Trant, supra note 117.
129. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §3:99 (West 4th ed. 1997). Cf
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985). This
principle is equally applicable in the private prison context. See, e.g., Street v. Correctional Corp. of America, 102
F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1996).
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liability. In the private prison context, this difficulty is magnified, as the state is one
step further removed from exposure to liability (at least to the extent that agents of
the state are not "deliberately indifferent" within the meaning of these claims).130
Notwithstanding McKnight's clarifying functions, then, the state still seems able to
reduce its level of legal responsibility to inmates when it incarcerates them in
private prisons. Similarly, it seems probable that the use of private prisons
generally limits the litigation expenses of states as well.' 3 1
It also is likely that the juridical structure of the private prison attenuates and
ultimately insulates the state from accountability of a more symbolic, political
kind. Private prisons tend to distance public officials from responsibility for the
way private prisons are run. The most obvious evidence of this is that, when
private prisons are the subjects of scandal, corruption, and the like, journalists and
regulators focus first and most forcefully on the private character of the institution,
and only later, if at all, on more general public policy dimensions of criminal
incarceration. In similar fashion, the private prison converts the problems of
prisons-which are endemic and substantial in every case-into management
questions and questions of relative performance, efficiency, contract interpretation,
and so forth. Several critics of the private prison have articulated this issue in terms
of problems of misaligned "symbolism" and of "intervening" implications of the
private prison for the way the public understands the origins and functions of
criminal justice policy. 132
As if this situation did not sufficiently insulate the sovereign from its deeds,
there also are complex jurisdictional problems with contemporary private prisons.
In particular, private prisons frequently are established within jurisdictions differ-
ent from the contracting state (i.e., they house out-of-state inmates) or established
under contracting regimes that involve intervening governmental entities between
the contractor itself and the incarcerating government. Apparently, in Tennessee
alone, CCA houses inmates from Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Montana, and
Wisconsin.' 33 At present, Wisconsin holds the lead with more than 4,000 of its
inmates incarcerated in other states. 134 In Louisiana, a chronically abusive juvenile
detention center, housing state offenders, operated under a contracting scheme
that, by inserting a municipality, left no direct contractual privity between the state
and the facility.
135
130. See McDONALD E- AL., supra note 38, App. 3, at 18-21.
131. See id. at 21-24.
132. See, e.g., MARK D. JANus, BARs ON THE IRON TRIANGLE: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES IN THE PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECnONs 75, 76 (Gary W. Bowman et al., eds. 1993); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining
the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REv. 813, 826-27 (1987).
133. See PAREN', supra note 113, at 218.
134. See Mary Zahn & Richard P. Jones, As Top Inmate Exporter State Creates Prison Debate, MILWAUKEE J.
SENEL, Jan. 24, 2000, at Al.
135. See Joanna Weiss, State Takeover of Tallulah Center May Calm Tension, Tales of Abuse of Inmates, NEW
ORLEANS TfMES-PiCAYuNE, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al.
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In such situations, there remains a great deal of legal uncertainty, which seems
to have benefited the contractors more than the states or the wayward inmates. 13
6
In one notable case, two violent sex offenders from Oregon, housed at a CCA
"immigrant detention center" outside of Houston, escaped from the facility. This
caused the firm, which initially had declared that it had no obligation to notify the
local authorities of the' institution's presence, to proclaim that it was not their
function to capture them. When the local authorities captured the inmates, at their
own expense, it turned out that because they escaped from a private facility, the
escapees could not be prosecuted under Texas law. 37 In a manner slightly
reminiscent of state attempts to recover stipulated fines for escapes under convict
leasing, Texas since has embarked on a campaign to recover costs of recapture
from private prison operators, 38
The merger of the public and private in the private prison inevitably confuses, as
well, the issue of access to private prisons-to prison grounds, records, and so
forth. 39 The courts and legislatures have long struggled with access issues in the
prison context and have long had to balance the advantages of and legal claims to
open access against penological (usually security related) concerns. Foucault
describes how all prisons refine the punitive authority of the state by cloaking the
mechanisms of punishment in a veil of secrecy. 140 By its very nature, the private
prison renders the prison all the more insular and the legal questions surrounding
access vastly more complicated, for it adds to the mix the proprietary rights of
prison contractors. The issue has not lent, and perhaps cannot lend, itself to any
consistent resolution and should be understood as one of several ways the private
prison exacerbates the irrationalities of the modem prison. 14 1
Yet another area of legal complication centers on the due process rights of
inmates incarcerated in private prisons. The law in this area clearly favors the
136. See McDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at App. 3, pp. 47-48.
137. This 'story received considerable publicity. The incident prompted the understated observation that the
laws had not "caught up" with the private prison phenomenon. Private Prisons Shackle Texas with Confusion:
State Laws Haven't Caught Up with New Phenomenon, Cm. TRe., Nov. 7, 1996, at 34.
138. See State Billing Private Prisons for Hunting Escapes, RiotAid, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1997, at 15.
139. On this issue, see, e.g., SmcHoR, supra note 40, at 121-25; ROBBINS, supra note 115, at 345-46.
140. FOUCAULT, supra note 39, at 232-56.
141. On the outlines of this issue, see McDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 37-38. A recent case from the
Montana Supreme Court aptly illustrates the point. Forced to weigh the conflicting claims of a newspaper
company's desire for access to a hearing against a private prison contractor's attempts to keep private certain
proprietary information, the court had no statutory license or guidance to deal with the question with any nuance
whatsoever, and simply threw the hearing open to the public. Great Fails Tribune Co. v. Day, 959 P.2d 508 (Mont.
1998).
To the extent that private prisons will remain able to avoid such outcomes-and it seems clear that some
deference to their proprietary interests will usually prevail-their resulting ability to limit access suggests the
doubly private character of the private prison: a proprietary character combined with a private (i.e., secretive)
dimension in Foucault's sense. For Foucault, the essence of the prison is its secretive character. The ability of
private prisons to invoke proprietary interests to limit public access reveals a tendency to preserve and extend this
tendency. FOUCAULT, supra note 39.
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promulgation of consistent, predictable rules and procedures-of the kind, as
mentioned earlier, that comport with one of the main normative aspirations of the
rule of law and that, as a more substantive matter, ensure that states retain ultimate
control over decisions affecting basic terms and conditions of incarceration. The
existence of even seemingly mundane rules and procedures are particularly
important to the extent that they govern internal affairs of prisons-for example,
disciplinary proceedings-that can have substantial implications for length and
conditions of incarceration. With private prisons, it seems inevitable to some
commentators (not to mention being consistent with the reality of the situation)
that the private institutions themselves will, notwithstanding the law, be able to
retain substantial authority over these matters, particularly the administration (as
opposed to the making) of rules and procedures. 142 To the extent as well that states
are unlikely to enact effective safeguards, the possibility remains that the private
prisons may be able cynically to sustain their occupancy rates, and therefore their
revenues (as most contracts are per inmate/per diem), by manipulating inmates'
terms of incarceration.
143
Like convict leasing, too, the confused juridical structure of the contemporary
private prison is intrinsically connected to endemic corruption. With the private
prison, the relevant public and private parties frequently seem to wear the same
hat, or live under the same roof, as it were. When, in 1985, CCA attempted to
contract with Tennessee for a ninety-nine year management contract covering all
the state's facilities, it turned out that the governor's wife and the Speaker of the
State House owned stock in the firm. '4 Indeed, CCA was founded by politically
connected figures: its principle founder was a former chairman of Tennessee's
Republican Party.1 45 Similarly, Louisiana's chronically troubled Tallulah Correc-
tional Center for Youth originally was owned by a group of partners intimately
connected to former Governor Edwin Edwards, himself a perennial subject of
corruption investigations. Somewhat more direct influence over the political
process on the part of private prison operatives also is evident. In Arkansas, the
founder of a private prison company recently was sentenced to prison for
attempting to bribe a correctional official.147 In Georgia, CCA invested over $130
million in building 4,500 beds before it had any contracts with the state to house
142. See SHICHOR, supra note 40, at 80-85; Eric Bates, Private Prisons: Over the Next Five Years Analysts
Expect the Private Share of the Prison "Market" to More than Double, NATION, Jan. 5, 1998, at 11.
143. See SHnCiOR, supra note 40, at 51-52, 81-85.
144. See id. at 240-41.
145. See Paulette Thomas, Making Crime Pay: Triangle of Interests Creates infrastructure to Fight Lawless-
ness, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, atAl.
146. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIWEs, July 15,
1998, at Al; Editorial, Tallulah Situation is a Wake-Up Call, BATON ROUGEADVOC., Aug. 2, 1998, at B8. The firm
in question, Trans-American Development Associates, includes among its principals a state department head
under the former Governor.
147. See Deborah Yetter, Official Quits U.S. Corrections After Arkansas Indictment, LouisvaLE COURIER-J.,
Apr. 20, 1996, at A7.
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any inmates. Instead, the company had "an understanding" with Georgia's correc-
tional officials and with local politicians-notwithstanding the state's competitive
bid laws. 148 In that case, Georgia's Commissioner of Corrections illegally commu-
nicated with CCA's lobbyist on the project tiroughout the bidding process. 149 In
Ohio, CCA recently managed, through a "lobbying blitz," to defeat legislative
attempts to regulate the state's private prisons.' 50 CCA's lobbyists include, on a
national level, J. Michael Quinlan, former Bureau of Prisons Chief under President
George Bush Sr., and in Tennessee (again) the wife of the Speaker of the State
House.15 1 In California, CCA, Wackenhut, and Cornell Corrections recently were
reported to have retained some of the state's "most powerful lobbyists" to expand
their market. 1
52
While there is not yet any credible evidence of contractors' attempts, as was the
case with convict leasing, to manipulate the criminal law to bolster their business
prospects, a finance officer at CCA apparently described the 1994 Federal Crime
Bill, with its tougher penalties and grants for prison construction, as something
"very favorable to us.' 53 Similarly, a recent conference of private prison contrac-
tors featured a keynote address (by Charles Thomas, whose scholarly contributions
are cited in this Article) entitled, "The market remains quite positive.' ' 154 Suffice to
say, there is certainly structural potential for this type of conduct-but given
current rates of growth in incarceration, such lobbying is for the moment quite
unnecessary anyway.1 55
As was also the case with convict leasing, many private prisons appear unable to
insulate decisions about the quality of penological functions from financial
148. See Editorial, Private Prison 'Understanding'May Evade Law, ATLANTA J. CONS'r., Apr. 11, 1999, at G4.
149. See Ann Hardie, Spotlight on Private Prisons Contract Bidding: Phone Call to Friend is Still
Aboveboard, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 22, 1999, at B 1.
150. See Mark Tatge, Prison Control Bill Dies in Senate: Private Operator Blocks Attempt at Regulation,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 25, 1997, at B6.
151. See Bates, supra note 142. One of CCA's board members, Joseph Johnson, is former executive director of
the Rainbow Coalition; according to Bates, Johnson recently used his political influence to win a contract to buy
outright a District of Columbia prison-structure and all.
152. See Niel Brinkerhoff, Fieldof... Dreams?, CAL. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 14.
153. Thomas, supra note 145, atA6.
154. Bruce Shapiro, Portfolio Prisons: A Private Prison Management Conference Focuses on Accountability
to a Corporate Board Rather than to the Public, and Profit Motive the Push Rather than Inmate Concerns,
NATION, Oct. 20, 1997, at 4.
155. See Bates, supra note 142, at 17-18 (stating that private prison corporations have the financial incentive
and influence to lobby for harsher criminal penalties, but that there is no current need to do so).
Professor Thomas seems to personify yet another dimension of the corruption that runs with private prisons: the
corruption of academic discourse. Thomas, an otherwise respected and competent scholar at the University of
Florida and a major contributor to the discussion of private prisons, also turns out to be, in essence, the corporate
ideologist of CCA and of the private prison industry in general. At the same time that Thomas was extolling the
merits of private prisons with such detached objectivity, he and his "public" organization maintained over $1
million in direct interests in CCA; and Thomas himself served on boards connected to the company. See Gilbert
Geis et al., Private Prisons, Criminological Research, and Conflict of Interest: A Case Study, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
373, 373-75 (1999) (describing Thomas's conflict of interest in the private prison context).
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considerations. Critics of private prisons continually identify horrendous examples
of avaricious, sometimes downright mercenary conduct by prison operators-
including underpayment and under-training of guards and other employees,
overcrowding, improper classification of inmates, and patently inadequate security
structures.1 56 When, in 1994, Human Rights Watch investigated the Tallulah
juvenile facility described above, it found not only questionable physical struc-
tures and inadequate services, but also that offenders were short of food and
provided with grossly inadequate clothing.1 57 Company officials there success-
fully resisted for several years attempts to amend these and other abominable
conditions, prompting four temporary takeovers by the state (the last one perma-
nent) as well as extensive litigation.' 5" When recently denied a unilateral demand
for increased per diem compensation, the facility's owners (who had just obtained
a lucrative and discretionary buy out in the face of a final take-over) simply cut
back again on the provision of basic necessities.' 59 A newer private juvenile
facility in Louisiana, operated by Wackenhut, was also recently made the object of
a Justice Department lawsuit alleging, among other outrages, inadequate health
care and education, shortages of food, shoes, and bedding.
1 60
Indeed, the intrusion of profit motives into management decisions is a pervasive
problem with private prisons. The most salient expression of this is that private
prison officials inevitably find themselves having to balance separate, often
competing interests and sort out competing loyalties. Much of the supposed
competitive advantage of private prisons derives from their ability to sidestep the
civil service wages required with public prison guards. This dynamic encourages
not only the employment of under-trained and disinterested employees but
aggregate reductions in staffing-practices which in turn account in part for
elevated levels of abuse, inmate-on-inmate violence, and so forth. ' 6' At each of the
private juveniles facilities just mentioned, the Justice Department cited inadequate
training, retention, and compensation as contributing causes of abuse.
156. See, e.g., PARENTi, supra note 113, at 221-25; SHICHOR, supra note 40 (describing quality, management
and personnel issues in private prisons).
157. See HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN CONFINEmENT IN LOUISIANA (1995). Human Rights Watch found
that conditions at Louisiana's three public secure facilities for juveniles were abysmal, but nonetheless paled in
comparison to those at the private prison. Both the Justice Department and private advocates have since filed suit
against the state and the prison operators for conditions at Louisiana's juvenile facilities. Fox Butterfield, U.S.
Suing Louisiana on Prison Ills, N.Y. Tmns, Nov. 6, 1998, at A6.
158. See Vicki Ferstel, State Takes Control of Center in Tallulah, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 22, 1999, at IA.
159. See Vicki Ferstel, Official Defends Action on Prison: Fee Hike Decision Cited in Center Crisis, BATON
ROUGE ADvoc., Dee. 4, 1999, at lB. The buy out took the form of discretionary tax rebates supposedly reserved
for businesses that advance the state's economic development agenda; the total amount in this case was over
$700,000.
160. See Fox Butterfield, Justice Department Sues to Alter Conditions at a Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000,
at A 16.
161. See Bates, supra note 142 (stating that CCA under-staffs its prison, and hires personnel with records of
inmate abuse).
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In a manner also reminiscent of convict leasing, other methods sometimes are
employed to make money in private prisons besides simply economizing on
services. CCA was recently sued by an advocacy group claiming that the
corporation and its telephone carriers are earning super-profits by charging
exorbitant rates for inmate phone calls. ' 62 Though apparently not yet pervasive,
some private prisons replicate the convict lease system's signature practice of
setting their inmates to work at for-profit tasks. 63 This practice is accompanied by
a more common variant, which entails the leasing-out of inmate labor, but not
actual custody of the inmates, to private contractors-a system that replicates the
exploitation of early penitentiary inmates and is being sold to the public with the
same logic of fiscal efficiency. 64
My point in recounting these dysfunctions is not to rehash the claims of more
empirically and practically minded critics of private prisons. Instead, I wish to
emphasize that such dysfunctions are neither accidental nor episodic, but instead
are intimately related to the absence of rule of law norms. Put another way, these
dysfunctions are the predictable companions of a system premised on legal
confusion, on divided obligation and interests, on the stealthy extension of the
state-premised in short on the thoroughgoing abrogation of rule of law norms and
their sovereignty-restraining functions.
C. The Limits of Privatization Versus the Limits of the Prison
To a certain degree, this Article's critique might seem more an indictment of
privatization as such. Indeed, I am admittedly skeptical about most instances of
privatization. But because my arguments against the privatization of prisons focus
on the sovereignty-restraining ambition of the rule of law and on the perversion of
this ambition by the diffusion and extension of sovereignty, my claims in this
Article are primarily applicable to privatization where two factors are present: (1)
where the institution in question discharges extreme-that is, especially coercive
or violent-sovereign functions; and (2) where the privatized institution retains an
especially close connection to the state, the state's interests and its functions. Such
characteristics are, as we have seen, especially evident with the private prison.
To some extent, of course, virtually all institutions that can be privatized are
162. See Bill Miller, Prison Firm Sued over Phone Rates: High Costs Deter Contact, Families Say, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at B2.
163. See, e.g., Kristin Bloomer et al., America's Newest Growth Industry, IN THESE TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1997, No.
9, at 14 (describing private prisons' practice of putting prisoners to work at for-profit tasks); Randy Gragg, A
High-Security, Low-Risk Investment: Private Prisons Make Crime Pay, HARPER'S, Aug. 1996, at 50 (describing
Wackenhut Corporation's practice of contracting out inmate labor). See also Gordon Lafer, America's Prisoners
as Corporate Workforce, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 66 (describing anticipation of private prison
contractors and investors at prospect of setting private prison inmates to work).
164. See, e.g., Christian Parenti, Pay Now, Pay Later: States Impose Prison Peonage, PROGRESsIvE, July 1996,
No. 7, at 26 (describing the leasing-out of inmate labor). Parenti doubts that this practice will become pervasive.
PARENTr, supra note 113, at 230-35.
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coercive and entail the exercise of sovereign-like functions and functions which
otherwise could be performed by the state. To some extent, one also might argue,
virtually all privatizations remain connected to the state. Such statements parallel
the truth, so well exposed by critical legal scholars, that the public-private
distinction never is complete in any given direction anyway.1 65 Accordingly, it is
quite impossible to rigidly circumscribe the limits of this Article's critique.
Nevertheless, significant quantitative differences prevail between the levels of
coercion, of sovereignty, and of state presence evident with prisons versus, for
example, schools and utilities. In other words, the prison is unquestionably
extraordinary in its level of coerciveness and in its extreme representation of
sovereignty. Therefore, whether or not other types of privatization are problematic
(and again I think that they usually are), there are specific reasons why the private
prison is especially problematic from a rule of law standpoint. 
166
As is the case in all contexts where the fate of liberal legal norms are at stake, the
benefits accorded by adhering to the rule of law where prisons are concerned are
relative and contingent. The public prison remains intensely problematic and in
many ways inherently irrational. Rather than offering some romanticized defense
of the public prison, I conceive of this critique as a way of suggesting that there are
inherent, structural reasons to suppose that private prisons will always, on the
whole, remain more dysfunctional and indeed more socially malignant than public
prisons. But perhaps more fundamental from a rule of law standpoint is the idea
that at least the public prison is transparently problematic and irrational, and at
least it requires the state to face directly the political, legal, and fiscal costs of
pursuing a criminal justice policy that has brought about almost exponential
increases in the rate and the aggregate number of people incarcerated. Indeed, in a
society that claims a basis in rule of law norms, it is probably always a good thing
for the state to wage its own wars against its citizens and to do so in an obvious and
maximally costly way.
16 7
165. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835,
836 (1985) (stating that there is no meaningful way to label a court's decision intervention or laissez faire-there
is always a measure of state intervention in laissez faire).
166. There are, of course, other trends toward privatizations in the criminal justice system that more closely
approximate the private prison's coerciveness and intrinsic connection to the state. Notably in this regard are
phenomena like the expanding use of private police forces, the attempt, as through victims' rights, to reestablish
private control over criminal prosecutions, the privatization of parole and probation functions, and so forth, that
seem relatively close to the private prison in their juridical structure. Clearly these and similar developments
deserve the same kind of scrutiny as the private prison.
167. What does this Article finally say about the public-private distinction? Again, my own faith in the doctrine
is quite contingent. I welcome its constructive abrogation in constructive contexts (for example, in the domestic
violence context, where the erosion of the public-private distinction may expand the enjoyment of rule of law
norms). And I absolutely welcome the day that the march of history negates the public-private distinction, or even
for that matter, the rule of law, entirely-provided, of course, that the outcome is rational in the deepest sense of
that word. But what I reject-and what I believe is evident with the private prison-is an abrogation of the
public-private distinction that is not only irrational, but also does nothing to resolve the social, political, and legal
conflicts that underlie the existence of this divide in the first place.
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VI. RULE OF LAW, THE PRIVATE PRISON, AND THE INEVITABLE
SPECTER OF ILLEGITIMACY
In the end, it may be that the problem of privatization is no more than a
reflection of the irrationality of contemporary society and a reflection, too, of what
Roger Cotterrell, following Neumann, has called the "largely unfavorable condi-
tions in which the idea of Rule of Law seems to exist today."1 68 Such seems
certainly true of the private prison, which is at root a sub-species of an institution
that is, in the final analysis, fundamentally irrational. Put another way, we might
think of the private prison and convict leasing as together demonstrating the
inability of the legal structure of the liberal state to retain its coherence in the
context of fundamentally illiberal practices in punishment. But as always, there are
real choices between unattainable ideals and the brutal reality of the status quo.
From this standpoint, the private prison emerges as something worthy of great
concern precisely because of the inherent irrationality of prison as such.
Finally, I do not deny that aggressive courts, competent legislatures, and zealous
reformers theoretically could resolve all the diverse problems that plague private
prisons: the uncertainty about liability and the line between the state and the
contractor, the problems of accountability and public perception, the jurisdictional
problems, and so forth. But if convict leasing suggests anything about private
prisons it is first that juridical structure is relevant to the prospects of reform, and
second that the possibility of reform must not be confused with its probability. Of
course, for those who approach this issue in a more principled, or at least more
skeptical way, this is all beside the point anyway, since it is clear that reforming
and clarifying the legal and political character of an institution premised on the
merger of the public and private only can be accomplished by legalizing the
interpenetration of public and private and by affirming the normative dysfunctions
that come with the private prison. For, while the institutions' various dysfunctions-
corruption, abuse, confusion about liability-seem quite logically related to a lack
of state regulation and control, increasing the involvement of the state in the
operation of private prisons, short of abolishing private prisons as such, can only
have the effect of more deeply entrenching the juridical dynamics-the interpen-
etration of public and private and the diffusion and extension of sovereignty-that
underlay the private prison's problematic character in the first place. From a rule of
law standpoint, the private prison seems a hopelessly problematic institution.
168. Cotterrell, supra note 25, at 464.
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